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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team (“black
sheep”) exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from report-
ing such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a “wall of silence”). Much cited examples include
hospitals and police departments. In this paper, these features arise in equilibrium. An important ingredient
of our model are benefits that agents receive when cooperating with each other in a team. Our results suggest
that teams in which the importance of these benefits varies across team members are especially prone to the
above-mentioned phenomenon.
© 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
In July 2003, a test driver of DaimlerChrysler drove a Mercedes prototype from corporate
headquarters in Stuttgart (Germany) to the company’s test site in Papenburg, which is located
about 300 miles to the north. On the highway he drove very fast (allegedly 150 mph), thereby
aggressively tailgating a slower car. The driver of that car became so scared by the incident that
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she hit two trees on the roadside after losing control of her vehicle. Both the driver and her 2-year-
old daughter were killed. In the courtroom, the key question was whether it had really been the
test driver who had tailgated the slower car. Hence, the timing of the test driver’s trip became an
issue, and precise evidence on his departure time from headquarters and his arrival time at the test
site was crucial. Yet such information was very hard to elicit as colleagues of the test driver were
claiming they could not remember any details at all. In the end, the test driver was convicted by
the testimony of two other motorists whom he had passed shortly before the accident. After the
trial, the judge complained about the test driver’s colleagues’ strong reluctance to cooperate with
the authorities, presuming that none of them liked to be considered a denigrator (see Su¨ddeutsche
Zeitung, 2004).
In this paper, we study two interrelated questions. First, we ask why (otherwise honest) indi-
viduals such as the test driver’s colleagues might implicitly tolerate certain actions by fellows
even if they dislike such behavior? That is, why might they “set up a wall of silence”? Second, we
simultaneously study how such potential walls of silence affect the incentives of would-be “black
sheep” to misbehave.1
Apart from the above example, there exist a number of other settings where similar phenomena
arise. Most prominently, in police departments, the so-called blue wall of silence refers to police
officers’ reluctance to testify against their colleagues. For example, in an anonymous survey
conducted among US police officers, 79% of respondents confirmed that they were aware that a
code of silence existed, and 46% stated that they had witnessed misconduct but concealed what
they knew (see Trautman, 2000). Furthermore, according to the Mollen Commission (1994, p.
51) that investigated police violence in New York “the vast majority of honest police officers
still protect the minority of corrupt officers”. In a similar vein, Chevigny (1995, p. 92) reports
that according to members of New York’s Civilian Complaint Review Board, “it had never had
a case in which a police witness testified against another”.2 Walls of silence also seem to exist
in other areas of law enforcement: according to the recent Hagar Report (2004) that investigated
California’s Department of Corrections, there is a pervasive code of silence among prison guards
that protects rogue guards.
Further examples abound. According to the white wall of silence, doctors are reluctant to
testify against colleagues in cases of malpractice.3 Furthermore, in the law literature on labor
arbitration it has been noted that “arbitrators are aware that many employers refrain from calling
co-workers as witnesses out of respect for the code that prohibits employees from testifying
against one another [emphasis added]” (Gosline, 1988, p. 45). In addition, it has been suggested
that, in the education sector, high school teachers remain silent about blatantly failing colleagues
in the classroom (see Los Angeles Daily News, 2001). Moreover, there is systematic evidence
that teenagers are reluctant to report misbehavior by their peers; for example, in a survey among
3400 Toronto high school students, Tanner and Wortley (2002) found that more than half of
those surveyed did not report to adult authority figures (parents, teachers, or police) after being
1 It might be less puzzling to observe walls of silence in criminal teams, where all members are misbehaving. Such
settings have, for example, been analyzed in the recent literature on leniency programs in antitrust, see for example, Motta
and Polo (2003), Feess and Walzl (2004), and also the seminal paper on self-reporting by Kaplow and Shavell (1994).
2 Moreover, this phenomenon does not seem to be confined to US police departments; see for example, Huberts et al.
(2003) and Ekenvall (2003) for evidence on the Netherlands, and on Sweden and Croatia, respectively.
3 The Committee on Quality of Health Care in America reports that, while the number of deaths in US hospitals due to
malpractice is estimated to be up to 98,000 per year (see Kohn et al., 1999), “two thirds of the nation’s hospitals haven’t
reported a single adverse incident involving a physician in the last eight years” (CNN and TIME, 2000). See also the
recent book by Gibson and Singh (2003).
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victimized, and they conclude that there exists a teen code of silence.4 Finally, in community
contexts, individuals are often reluctant to report crimes to the police when the criminal belongs
to their community or even family (see e.g., Freeman, 1999; Donohue and Levitt, 2001; Finkelhor
and Ormrod, 2001). To summarize, the above discussion suggests that walls of silence are relevant
in a variety of contexts and, together with the related misbehavior, are perceived as serious
problems.5
In this paper, we propose an explanation for walls of silence, where agents do not report
out of reputational concerns because they worry about benefits from future cooperation. In the
following, this idea is spelled out in more detail. First, there is considerable evidence that potential
whistle-blowers worry about the reputational repercussions from cooperating with authorities.
For example, violators of the code of silence are often labeled “rats”, “snitches”, or “squealers”
and are no longer respected by their colleagues or fellows (see e.g., Gosline, 1988; Washington
Post, 1999). Likewise, in Tanner and Wortley’s survey among teenagers, 55% of all respondents
identified the potential stigma of being labeled an “informer” as a reason for not reporting. In a
similar spirit, in the above-mentioned survey among police officers by Trautman, the fear of being
“ostracized” and “blackballed” were the most frequent answers of why police officers would not
report misbehavior by colleagues.
Second, individuals often derive substantial (cooperation) benefits from being an accepted
group member rather than being ostracized. For example, police officers or prison guards need
to be backed up in dangerous situations. Hence, it is important for them to have attentive col-
leagues around, and there is indeed evidence suggesting that whistle-blowers do not always
receive maximum backup in such situations. Also, being ostracized might be harmful in terms of
career prospects. This has been witnessed by Richard Krupp, a whistle-blower in the California
Department of Corrections, who reports: “I would go for promotional interviews, and some of
the defendants in my [whistle-blower] case were sitting on the panel - my interview panel. So
I . . . stopped participating in the interviews, because . . . it was a waste of time . . .” (Sacramento
News & Review, 2004).6 Finally, ostracism might also be harmful in terms of business prospects.
To give just one example, in CNN & TIME (2000), a physician argues that a doctor might easily
suffer through ostracism because “other doctors could put him out of business by refusing to refer
him patients”. Note that cooperation benefits can be expected to differ across individuals. For
example, depending on the size of their business or on how many patients they acquire on their
own, different physicians might be harmed to a different degree in the case that colleagues refuse
to refer them patients. With respect to promotional concerns, being an accepted group member
might be considerably more important for juniors than for their more senior colleagues.
The second question we address in this paper is how the prospect of a wall of silence influences
the behavior of potential “black sheep” (i.e., team members who may pursue activities that increase
4 According to Washington Post (1999), “they hate that [misbehavior] but they won’t rat on the culprits”. For survey
evidence on the US, see, e.g., Finkelhor and Ormrod (2001). For a discussion from a law perspective on campus safety,
see for example, Epstein (2002).
5 For example, in the medical sector, the costs from preventable medical error (which are argued to arise partly as a
consequence of walls of silence) are estimated to be substantial (see, e.g., Kohn et al., 1999; Gibson and Singh, 2003).
Apart from direct negative effects of misbehavior, it is frequently pointed out that walls of silence might undermine public
trust in institutions such as the police. Also, the availability of (costly) educational instruments, such as on-site training
courses to reduce walls of silence, hints at the relevance of the problem.
6 In a similar vein, Gibson and Singh (p. 137) report the case of a physician who concedes (after having published a
study about an unusually high number of cardiac arrests in his hospital): “I can’t prove it, but I suspect my appointment
to full professor was delayed for several years as a result of this paper”.
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their own payoff but are disliked by their fellows). For example, anticipating a wall of silence,
doctors (teachers) may save on effort costs by not taking appropriate care (effort), thereby causing
harm to patients (students). Furthermore, police officers may handle suspects in a manner that,
while acceptable to themselves, may be considered unduly harsh or even brutal by others.7 That
is, in the analysis below we endogenize the level of misbehavior, giving rise to some interesting
predictions.
1.2. Framework and results
We analyze a model that exhibits the basic features of the above-mentioned examples as
equilibrium phenomena. Our aim is to provide conditions under which “black sheep” misbehave
and such misbehavior is tolerated by honest team members who set up a wall of silence. In the
model, individuals decide whether or not to cooperate and form a team. In order for reputational
concerns to have the potential to matter, we assume that honest team members differ with respect
to their privately known willingness to report misbehavior. For example, Huberts et al. (2003) and
Ekenvall (2003) have investigated police officers’ perceptions about their fellows’ willingness to
report. Interestingly, they find that while most officers disapprove of certain forms of misbehavior
and think it should be reported, there is considerable uncertainty about whether fellows would
do the same. In a similar spirit, Joseph McNamara, Hoover Fellow and former San Jose police
chief, notes that “A corrupt, racist, or brutal cop will abstain from misconduct only when he looks
at the cop next to him and believes that the officer will blow the whistle if he hits the suspect
[emphasis added]” (San Francisco Chronicle, 2003). As a consequence, the reporting decision
may convey information about an agent’s type, and this might affect his future payoffs. The
basic mechanism at work is that, by reporting misbehavior, honest team members may forego
future cooperation benefits (with “black sheep” or with other team members who also observe the
reporting). In turn, the anticipation of a wall of silence leads black sheep to misbehave in the first
place.
Our results on the existence of walls of silence (combined with potentially high levels of
misbehavior) are most robust in cases where teams are asymmetric in the sense that, com-
pared to their respective outside options, the benefit from cooperation is relatively high for
honest team members and relatively low for black sheep. Intuitively, in this case the potential
whistle-blower must provide sufficient incentives for the black sheep to engage in the team: an
opportunity to misbehave (at least to some degree) without being reported provides this incentive.
On the other hand, if teams are sufficiently symmetric in the sense that cooperation is rela-
tively beneficial for both parties, equilibria with walls of silence may arise, but they rely on
potentially questionable off-equilibrium beliefs. When ruling out such beliefs, walls of silence
cannot be sustained in the symmetric case and, as a consequence, black sheep choose not to
misbehave.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related
literature. The model is introduced in Sections 3 and 4 contains our main results, while Section 5
concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
7 However, it is important to note that while cases of police violence often receive the highest public attention, walls
of silence are likely to extend to many other forms of misbehavior. For example, the survey studies on police integrity
by Ekenvall (2003) and Huberts et al. (2003) document the phenomenon (to a varying degree) for 11 different forms of
misbehavior, of which only one relates to excessive use of force.
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2. Relation to the literature
The present paper contributes to previous research on (i) walls of silence, (ii) social norms,
and (iii) information transmission in organizations.
First, walls of silence have so far primarily been addressed in the law literature (see e.g.,
Gosline, 1988; Epstein, 2002) and in some survey studies in criminology and sociology (see
e.g., Finkelhor and Ormrod, 2001; Ekenvall, 2003; Huberts et al., 2003). These studies have
mainly focused on documenting walls of silence for either various types of misbehavior or across
countries. In general, they have not aimed at disentangling potential reasons for this phenomenon,
but have more generally alluded to loyalty towards the group.
Such willingness to treat group members favorably is well-known in social psychology, where
experimental subjects often exhibit ingroup bias even in setups based on the minimal group
paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971) where group membership is based on arbitrary characteristics.
One prominent explanation of this effect is based on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner,
1986) according to which the favoring of group fellows helps individuals to maintain self-esteem
and a positive identity (see e.g., Hewstone et al. (2002) and Mullen et al. (1992) for surveys of
this literature).8 So far, this literature has not focussed on walls of silence, and typically it has
considered experiments involving one-sided, one-shot transactions in anonymous environments,
the only information being to which group other subjects belong. In contrast, we enquire under
which conditions own group members are treated favorably when interaction is non-anonymous,
two-sided, and when it is not one-shot so that an individual’s behavior may have an impact on
her future payoff. While ingroup bias might play a role for the emergence of walls of silence, it
is interesting to note that those empirical studies that have explicitly looked into various reasons
for the emergence of walls of silence reveal that reputational concerns loom large in the decision
not to report misbehavior (see e.g., Trautman, 2000; Tanner and Wortley, 2002).9
To the best of our knowledge, there exists only one other formal analysis of walls of silence,
namely Benoit and Dubra (2004). They ask “Why Do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops?” and enquire
why a majority of agents (including some good ones) would favor the representation of all agents
(“the union”) to defend misbehaving colleagues indiscriminately over employing a candid strategy
in which the union honestly reports all information it has. In their model, there is a continuum
of agents who differ in their (exogenously given) action-type, ranging from “bad” agents who
display very inappropriate actions to better agents whose misbehavior is only minor. Their basic
idea is that in the case of an indiscriminate strategy a court will tend not to listen to the union’s
statement because it contains no information. If the court’s prior belief of facing a sufficiently
good type is high enough, then even some of the relatively good agents prefer the indiscriminate
strategy because this reduces their probability of being subject to a type II error (i.e., of being
erroneously found to be bad).
Our approach differs in several important respects from Benoit and Dubra. First, in our model
the level of misbehavior by an agent is not exogenously given by his type, but arises endogenously
from that agent’s optimization problem. It seems likely that in a number of settings the level of
misbehavior is indeed a choice variable, and consequently, treating the level of misbehavior as
8 Recently, Hertel and Kerr (2001) have pointed out that the degree of the ingroup bias might depend on the context in
which a group operates. In particular, they show that appropriate priming of subjects can reduce this bias.
9 Interestingly, this is the case even in the context of law enforcement or among teenagers, where the threat of physical
retaliation might also be of relevance. For example, in Tanner and Wortley’s study among teenagers, reputational concerns
were cited more often as a reason for non-reporting than the threat of retaliation across all types of misbehavior studied.
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endogenous allows us to explore how the prospect of a wall of silence might affect it.10 Second,
while in Benoit and Dubra walls of silence emerge out of the fear of being subject to type II error
in the enforcement technology, we show that even in the absence of such errors, walls of silence
might arise as a result of the concern for (endogenously arising) cooperation benefits within teams.
Benoit and Dubra (p. 787f) do discuss such benefits, but they are not part of their model. Finally,
while Benoit and Dubra assume that a majority of agents preferring an indiscriminate union
suffices for a (complete) wall of silence to emerge, we focus on an individual agent’s incentive
for (not) reporting.
While not considering walls of silence, other economics papers have formally analyzed various
forms of misbehavior in the context of law enforcement. For example, Dharmapala and Miceli
(2003) analyze a related signaling model, where a court has to decide whether to trust evidence
that may have been planted by the police. They investigate how warrant requirements and tort
liability of officers, respectively, affect officers’ behavior and the truth-finding of courts. Similar
to our model, separating equilibria fail to exist so that there is no revelation of information in
equilibrium.
Second, as a wall of silence might be viewed as a social norm, our paper contributes to a
growing economic literature on this topic. While one strand of this literature has explored how the
existence of social norms affects economic behavior (for a recent contribution, see e.g., Huck et al.,
2003), a second strand has studied how such norms might emerge, seeking formal explanations
as to why agents obey certain behavioral rules for which they have no direct preference.11 A
number of these papers also employ signaling approaches, but with different focuses. For example,
Bernheim (1994) shows how heterogenous individuals are willing to conform to a single standard
when popularity in itself is deemed sufficiently important. Contrary to our paper, the issue of how
this willingness can be exploited by group members is not addressed. Furthermore, Kim and Ryu
(2003) study factors that lead to a culture of deviance. In a behavioral framework, Battaglini et
al. (2005) analyze the incentives of individuals to interact with peers in order to learn more about
their own characteristics, such as their willpower.
Finally, our paper could also be seen as a contribution to the literature on factors that hinder
the flow of information within organizations. While these papers typically rely on a standard
principal-agent framework (see e.g., Levitt and Snyder, 1997), we provide a different rationale
based on interaction between agents to explain such phenomena.
3. The model
We consider two risk-neutral individuals, B and G who derive benefits bc > 0 and gc > 0, respec-
tively, from cooperating with each other in a team. Individual B is a potential “black sheep” who
might engage in activities disliked by the “good guy” G. Throughout the paper, we will refer
to such activities as “misbehavior”. If no team is formed, G and B work on their own (thereby
foregoing the benefits from cooperation), where the values of their outside options are denoted
by go > 0 and bo > 0, respectively.
10 For example, police officers would presumably be more reluctant to treat subjects unduly harsh if they knew that their
colleagues would not tolerate such behavior.
11 Postulating that there exists an (ad hoc) social norm not to report on one’s fellows would seem to leave open the
question why there does not exist an alternative (and probably socially more desirable) norm under which the black sheep
are the ones being ostracized rather than the (honest) whistle-blowers (for a similar argument, see Benoit and Dubra).
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Fig. 1. The stage game.
3.1. Stage game
To capture dynamic effects, we assume that B and G play a stage game that is repeated twice,
where the two periods are denoted by t∈ {1, 2}. The stage game itself consists of four dates (see
Fig. 1).
• Dates 1 and 2 (team formation). To model the issues of team formation and cooperation
as simply as possible, we assume that at date 1, B decides whether to invite G to form a
team (TB ∈ {1, 0}). In case an offer has been made, G decides at date 2 whether to accept
(TG ∈ {1, 0}).12 When a team is formed (i.e., when TB·TG = 1), B and G receive their respective
cooperation benefits bc and gc, while otherwise they receive their reservation payoffs, bo and
go, respectively.
• Date 3 (misbehavior). Given that a team has been formed, B might choose to “misbehave” by
taking an action m∈ [0, m¯] that generates a private gain b(m), where b is a strictly increasing,
concave function satisfying b(0) = 0. As explained above, such behavior is disliked by G and
reduces his payoff by m.
• Date 4 (reporting). At date 4, G decides whether to report misbehavior m > 0 by B to some
authority (R∈ {1, 0}), which may then investigate the case.
3.2. Payoff consequences of reporting
We assume that G derives an expected (gross) benefit r(m) from reporting, which might, for
example, reflect his satisfaction from seeing B penalized for his misbehavior. Benoit and Dubra
report that such moral considerations indeed constitute a major reason for many (out of the
few) police officers who testify against their colleagues. We impose the following three natural
properties on r(m): (i) there is no benefit from reporting unless there is misbehavior by B, (ii)
this benefit is the higher, the higher the level of misbehavior, and (iii) although there is a benefit
from conviction, G prefers lower levels of misbehavior. Formally, this amounts to assuming
that r(0) = 0, and 0 < r′ < 1. As discussed in Section 1, G’s willingness to report is his private
information. To model this as simply as possible, we assume that G is one of two possible types
θ ∈ {H,D}. While a “conscientious” typeH has low reporting costs (which we set equal to zero), an
12 Alternatively, consider a setting where the parties first decide whether to form a team and subsequently whether to
cooperate (if a team has indeed been formed). Our assumptions below ensure that if the parties decide to forego the benefits
from cooperating, they will prefer their outside options. As a consequence, we do not consider the team formation and
cooperation decisions separately, and use these terms interchangeably. Note that our results below do not rely on the order
of moves and would continue to hold if G moves first.
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“opportunistic” type D faces fixed reporting costs τ > 0. For example, the types might simply face
different opportunity costs from filing a report (e.g., testifying in court can be time-consuming).
Alternatively, they might differ with respect to their (intrinsic) willingness to cooperate with
authorities or to treat team fellows favorably.13 Thus, in the absence of reputational concerns,
type H is readily willing to report any level of misbehavior, while type D is more reluctant to
do so: the net benefit from reporting differs across types and is given by r(m) for type H and by
r(m) − τ for type D. As a result, type D will only report if the level of misbehavior is sufficiently
large. With prior h Prob(θ = H) > 0, G is “conscientious” and with probability (1 − h) he is
“opportunistic”, where h is common knowledge.14 We assume that G learns his type in the first
period after a team has been formed.15
As for the payoff consequence of reporting for B, we take the authority’s enforcement tech-
nology as exogenously given (i.e., we assume that it is independent of the players’ actions and
can be represented by a mapping from the level of misbehavior into expected penalties).16 These
penalties consist of a fine and/or the monetary equivalent of imprisonment. In particular, given
that B has taken action m and has been reported by G, the expected penalty that B faces is given
by a function p(m) with the following properties: (i) the enforcement technology is not subject to
type II error (i.e., there is no penalty unless there is misbehavior), (ii) the penalty is the higher,
the higher the level of misbehavior, and (iii) penalties are sufficiently high to deter misbehavior if
reporting occurs with certainty. Formally, this amounts to p(0) = 0 and p′ > b′, and, for technical
convenience, we assume p′′ ≥ 0.
3.3. Information structure and equilibrium concept
Throughout, we assume that G has private information concerning his type, but that the parties
are symmetrically informed about all other variables. The above definitions and assumptions
apply to both periods of the game, and the two periods differ in only two ways. First, G knows
his type at the beginning of the second period because he has learned it in the first period, and
second, while the first-period belief equals h, based on the observed reporting behavior in the
first period, B might hold a belief β = h at the beginning of the second period. To solve this game
of incomplete information, we focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) that are robust with
13 For example, in the literature on ingroup bias discussed above, individuals typically differ with respect to the strength
of this bias.
14 One might wonder whether, in practice, team members might not become aware of their fellows’ types over time. In
this respect, it is interesting to note that even in the police context (where there is the most evidence on walls of silence)
turnover can be considerable, probably limiting the above effect. For example, in the San Francisco police department,
which has been plagued by a number of adverse incidents, “sixty percent of patrol officers have been on the force less than
five years” (San Francisco Chronicle, 2003). Moreover, below we show that a “wall of silence”-outcome might emerge
even if the degree of uncertainty is low.
15 This assumption only serves to simplify the exposition. If G would learn his type already at the beginning of the game,
then (in addition to the later reporting decision) the team formation decision might also be used as a signaling device,
which makes the analysis much more tedious. However, we have analyzed this alternative timing, and it can be shown that
(i) in any equilibrium, the team formation decisions of both types of G must be identical, and (ii) the same team formation
decisions as in the case where G learns his type only after date 2 obtain in equilibrium (details are available from the
authors upon request). Consequently, while adding considerable formal complexity, this alternative timing would not alter
our results in any way.
16 That is, the authority does not necessarily discover the exact level of misbehavior, and as a consequence there is a
possibly stochastic connection between the level of misbehavior and the result of all legal enforcement activities. Given
that the penalty function p(m) is exogenous, our results continue to hold if the authority can uncover m.
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respect to the Intuitive Criterion as proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987), and restrict attention to
pure strategies.
4. Analysis of the model
4.1. Static problem
In this section, we derive the properties of all potential period 2 equilibrium strategies. Below,
we show that given our assumptions the last period of the game can be solved by backwards
induction because the circularity between equilibrium strategies and equilibrium beliefs normally
present in dynamic games of incomplete information is not an issue. As a consequence, the period
2 equilibrium outcome is identical to the outcome of a static version of the model, where the stage
game is played only once. Note that in the following we omit the time subscript t = 2 for ease of
notation.
Since at the end of the game, G no longer has to worry about his reputation, optimality of his
strategy implies that he will report whenever he expects a positive net benefit from doing so. This
implies that (with the exception of cases of indifference) the equilibrium reporting strategies
R*(m; θ) of both types θ of G only depend on the level of misbehavior m (and not on other parts
of the history of the game).17 This leads to the following result.
Lemma 1 (reporting strategies in static case). In period 2, type H reports whenever misbehavior
occurs, while type D does so only if the level of misbehavior is sufficiently large. Formally, R*(m;
H) = 1 ∀ m > 0 and R∗(m; D) = 1 ⇔ m > m˜, where m˜ is implicitly defined by r(m˜) ≡ τ, and we
have m˜ > 0.
To rule out uninteresting cases, in the following we assume that there exist sufficiently large
levels of m for which type D reports (i.e., m˜ < m¯).
When determining the optimal level of misbehavior, B takes G’s subsequent reporting strategy
into account. This implies that, in equilibrium, the period 2 level of misbehavior depends only on
B’s belief β of facing type H at this point in time. It follows that B’s optimal level of misbehavior
as a function of β is given by
m∗(β) ≡ argmax
m
{b(m) − [β · R∗(m; H) + (1 − β) · R∗(m; D)] · p(m)}, (1)
where the term in square brackets denotes the expected reporting decision given a belief β of
facing type H. We obtain the following result.
Lemma 2 (misbehavior in static case). The optimal period 2 level of misbehavior does not exceed
m˜. In particular, m∗(0) = m˜, m*(1) = 0, and m*(β) is weakly decreasing in β.
Fig. 2 serves to illustrate Lemma 2: note that for all levels of misbehavior above m˜, B would
be reported by both types (i.e., with certainty), and hence our assumption that p′ > b′ implies that
such high levels of misbehavior cannot be optimal. On the one hand, if B is relatively certain
of facing type D (see the left panel), he chooses the maximal level of m for which no reporting
occurs. On the other hand, if B’s belief of facing type H is sufficiently high (see the right panel),
he chooses m = 0 because misbehavior does not pay in this case. Finally, for intermediate values
17 In the following we proceed in a similar manner, and only those parts of the history that might have a non-trivial
impact are included as arguments in the equilibrium strategies.
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Fig. 2. The optimal level of misbehavior in the static problem.
of β, the optimal level of misbehavior lies between 0 and m˜ and is weakly decreasing in the
probability of facing type H. As Lemma 2 implies m∗(β) ≤ m˜, it follows that only type H reports
in equilibrium: there is a (partial) wall of silence in the static case because misbehavior is only
reported with probability h. Given that type D faces reporting costs τ, this result is not surprising.
In the next section, however, we show how a wall of silence, where neither type reports, may
emerge due to reputational concerns in a dynamic setup.
Finally, we turn to team formation. Whether the parties are indeed willing to form a team
(in principle) depends on the subsequent level of misbehavior by B and the resulting reporting
behavior of G. It will be useful to distinguish the following two cases: a symmetric team case,
where cooperation is sufficiently attractive for both parties such that the team is always formed,
and an asymmetric team case, where cooperation depends on the anticipated behavior of the
parties within a team. In the dynamic setup, we are mainly interested in the reporting behavior of
the honest G (which is potentially driven by B’s subsequent willingness to cooperate with him).
Consequently, we assume that G always prefers to be part of the team, and vary B’s cooperation
benefit to distinguish the two cases.
Assumption 1 (G’s benefit from cooperation). Cooperation is sufficiently attractive for party G.
Formally, gc > m¯ + go.
Assumption 1 implies that either type of G prefers cooperation with B over being on his own
independent of the belief of B. Hence, whenever B proposes to form a team, both types of G
accept, which implies that in equilibrium G’s team formation decision has no effect on the belief
held by B.
Now consider B’s team formation decision. Note that B’s payoff inside the team is given by
bc + [b(m*(β)) −β·p(m*(β))], while his outside option is given by bo. As B always has the option
not to misbehave, it follows that the term in square brackets is non-negative. Hence, if bc ≥ bo (the
symmetric case), B will always want to form a team. On the other hand, if bc < bo (the asymmetric
case), this does not necessarily hold true: agent B will only propose to form a team if he expects
to derive a strictly positive expected payoff from misbehaving, which can only be the case for m
strictly positive. To put it differently, B’s belief β of facing type H must be sufficiently low such
that the term in square brackets above is sufficiently large. This leads to the following result.
Lemma 3 (team formation in static case). In equilibrium, each type of G accepts the offer by B
to cooperate. In the symmetric case, B offers to cooperate. In the asymmetric case, B offers to
cooperate if and only if his belief of facing type H is not too large. Formally, TG*(H) = TG*(D) = 1,
TB*(β) = 0 if bc − bo < 0 and β > ˜β, and TB*(β) = 1 otherwise, where ˜β is implicitly defined by
bo − bc = b(m∗( ˜β)) − ˜β · p(m∗( ˜β)), and where ˜β < 1 holds.
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Lemma 3 implies that B might choose not to offer to cooperate with G when both his outside
option and his belief of facing type H are sufficiently large. In order to avoid trivial outcomes,
we assume that the critical belief level ˜β is sufficiently large such that, given the prior belief h, B
offers to cooperate. Formally, this amounts to ˜β > h if bc < bo. If this assumption is violated, then
in the asymmetric team case there is a unique equilibrium outcome where the parties exercise
their outside options in both periods.
For a given belief β∈ [0, 1] at the beginning of period 2, the period 2 equilibrium outcome is
unique and described by Lemmas 1–3. This equilibrium outcome would also obtain in a static,
one-shot version of the present game, where the stage game is only played once. In particular,
in this static case β = h holds, and in the static equilibrium outcome the team is formed, there is
misbehavior m*(h), and only type H reports. Formally (under slight abuse of notation):
{TB∗ = TG∗ = 1,m∗(h), R∗(m∗(h); D) = 0, R∗(m∗(h); H) = 1}. (2)
In the next section we turn to a dynamic version of the game and show how, in equilibrium, a
wall of silence may be set up by both types.
4.2. Dynamic problem
In the dynamic case, G may potentially signal his type through his first period reporting
decision, and hence reputational concerns might influence his willingness to cooperate with the
authorities.18 In the following, we speak of a separating equilibrium if the parties cooperate in
period 1 and make different period 1 reporting decisions (i.e., if R∗1(m∗1; H) = R∗1(m∗1; D)), and of
a pooling equilibrium otherwise. In a separating equilibrium, at the beginning of period 2 B knows
which type of G he faces, whereas in a pooling equilibrium B receives no additional information
through the period 1 reporting decision. Therefore, in a pooling equilibrium B’s belief β at the
beginning of period 2 has to equal the prior belief h.
Separating equilibria. In a first step, we show that in any equilibrium B cannot distinguish
between the two types at the beginning of period 2.
Proposition 1 (no separating equilibria). In any equilibrium it holds that for any level of misbe-
havior both types of G make identical reporting decisions (i.e., separating equilibria fail to exist).
Formally, R∗1(m1; H) = R∗1(m1; D) ∀m1.
To see the intuition behind this result suppose, for example, that for a given level m1 of first-
period misbehavior only typeH (but not typeD) is supposed to report. The consistency requirement
for the beliefs of B at the beginning of period 2 implies β = 1 if G has reported, and β = 0 otherwise
(i.e., there is no leeway in forming off-equilibrium beliefs). It then follows that there is always one
type who has an incentive to deviate. First, consider the case of a symmetric team, where the team
is always formed independent of B’s belief (see Lemma 3). In this case, type D has an incentive
to report as well because the resulting reduction in the second period level of misbehavior would
outweigh his first period reporting costs. Second, in the case of an asymmetric team B would not
cooperate with type H, which induces the latter to refrain from reporting. In the remaining case
18 In reality, upon finding (sufficiently large) misbehavior, authorities might effectively rule out further (second-period)
interaction with a black sheep B (e.g., if as a consequence of a conviction B is fired or, in the case of a doctor, he loses
his licensure). In this case, our model nevertheless applies if one assumes that there are other team members (such as
other colleagues) who observe the first-period interaction between G and B and with whom G may want to interact in the
second period.
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of a candidate equilibrium where only type D (but not type H) is supposed to report, a similar
intuition applies.
Pooling equilibria. In a next step, we consider pooling equilibria. In order to economize on
notation, the period 1 reporting decision in a pooling equilibrium is denoted by R∗1(m1). Note that
because β = h in any candidate pooling equilibrium, the unique period 2 equilibrium outcome is
given by (2). An important preliminary step to identifying pooling equilibria is to characterize
under which circumstancesR∗1(m1) = 0 andR∗1(m1) = 1, respectively, are consistent with equilib-
rium. As has been argued above, in the present framework the One-Deviation Principle (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991) applies, and hence only simple deviations from the candidate period 1 reporting
strategies need to be considered. This observation allows us to derive the following result.
Lemma 4 (only one type is relevant). Independent of off-equilibrium beliefs, R∗1(m1) =
0(R∗1(m1) = 1) is consistent with equilibrium if and only if type H (type D) has no incentive
to deviate.
To illustrate the intuition behind Lemma 4 suppose that the equilibrium strategies prescribe
R∗1(m1) = 1, and consider a deviation to non-reporting. In the first period (relative to type H) type
D saves reporting costs τ. In the second period (relative to type D) type H obtains a reporting
benefit [r(m*(β)) − r(m*(h))] that is smaller than τ. This follows from the fact that both m*(β)
and m*(h) are not larger than m˜ (see Lemma 2). Hence, type D has a larger incentive to deviate.
A similar logic applies to the case R∗1(m1) = 0.
Off-equilibrium beliefs. We now briefly turn to the issue of off-equilibrium beliefs in pool-
ing equilibria. Given that for a certain m1 the equilibrium period 1 reporting strategy prescribes
R∗1(m1) = 1, denote the off-equilibrium belief following a deviation to non-reporting by β1(m1).
Analogously, when the equilibrium strategy prescribes R∗1(m1) = 0, denote the belief following a
deviation to reporting by β0(m1). At the outset, the concept of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium does
not impose any restrictions on the off-equilibrium beliefs party B may hold in a pooling equilib-
rium. If the Intuitive Criterion has bite, it follows from Lemma 4 that β0(m1) = 1, respectively,
β1(m1) = 0 has to hold because in the former (latter) case a deviation is potentially more profitable
for type H(D). For example, in the case R∗1(m1) = 0 the Intuitive Criterion has bite if (given that
B holds the most favorable beliefs) a deviation would be profitable for type H, but not for type D.
In many cases, however, the Intuitive Criterion will have no bite, but nevertheless in light of
Lemma 4 certain off-equilibrium beliefs might seem to be less plausible. In order to ensure that
our results on the emergence of walls of silence do not depend on potentially questionable off-
equilibrium beliefs, we impose an additional requirement. Suppose that in a pooling equilibrium
for a given m1 both types are supposed to report. If R∗1(m1) = 1 is indeed an equilibrium strategy,
both types of G would lose through such a deviation. However, Lemma 4 implies that this loss
would always be larger for type H. Hence, one could argue that in this case, B should not update
in the direction of type H. An analogous argument applies to the case R∗1(m1) = 0. Consequently,
in order to ensure the robustness of our results, we impose the following additional restriction on
off-equilibrium beliefs.19
Assumption 2 (off-equilibrium beliefs). β0(m1) > h > β1(m1) for all m1.
19 Assumption 2 is related to Cho and Kreps’ D1 criterion, which would in effect require attributing any deviation to the
type who has the larger incentive to deviate. However, even if we were to impose the stronger assumption β0(m1) = 1 and
β1(m1) = 0, our results would continue to hold. Intuitively, this is because under any of the equilibrium reporting strategies
identified below, the respective critical type will prefer the prior belief to having his type revealed.
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As will become clear below, in the asymmetric case (Section 4.2.2) our results do not depend
on whether or not Assumption 2 is imposed. In the symmetric case (Section 4.2.1), however,
“wall of silence”-equilibria (which survive the Intuitive Criterion) are eliminated by Assumption
2. Hence, invoking Assumption 2 makes it somewhat more difficult to sustain equilibria that
exhibit a wall of silence.
4.2.1. The symmetric case
When the cooperation benefits of both G and B are sufficiently large (i.e., if bc > bo), there
is always cooperation in period 2. First, Lemma 4 implies that R∗1(m1) = 0 is consistent with
equilibrium if type H has no incentive to deviate. On the one hand, if H sticks to R∗1(m1) = 0,
he faces a level of misbehavior m*(h) in the second period. On the other hand, if he deviates, he
obtains a reporting benefit of r(m1), but is subject to misbehavior m*(β0(m1)) in the next period.
Hence, taking the reporting benefits in period 2 into account, H’s incentive condition is given by
−m∗(h) + r(m∗(h)) ≥ r(m1) − m∗(β0(m1)) + r(m∗(β0(m1))). (3)
It is clear from (3) that only if deviating would lead to a higher level of misbehavior in period
2 might it be the case that H has an incentive to refrain from reporting some positive level of
misbehavior in period 1 (recall that r′ < 1). However, Assumption 2 precludes this case (because
it implies m*(β0(m1)) ≤m*(h)), and therefore, deviating is profitable for type H.
Second, R∗1(m1) = 1 is consistent with equilibrium as long as type D has no incentive to
deviate. On the equilibrium path type D would derive r(m1) − τ from reporting in period 1 and
face a level of misbehavior m*(h) in period 2. By deviating he would forego r(m1) − τ and (given
Assumption 2) face a higher level of misbehavior m*(β1(m1)) instead of m*(h).
Hence, type D has no incentive to deviate as long as
r(m1) − τ − m∗(h) ≥ −m∗(β1(m1)) ⇔ r(m1) + m∗(β1(m1)) − m∗(h) − τ ≥ 0, (4)
that is, as long as the utility loss due to the higher level of misbehavior is sufficiently large.
Inspecting inequality (4) reveals that this condition is easier to satisfy if Assumption 2 is imposed.
If (4) holds, reporting is a “credible threat” for either type. In this case it is optimal for B to choose
m1 = 0 because misbehavior would be reported with certainty. As B still gains bc from cooperating
with G, he nevertheless prefers this outcome to his (low) outside option bo. It can be shown that
off-equilibrium beliefs β1(m1), such that (4) is satisfied, exist if the prior belief of facing type H
is sufficiently large.
Proposition 2 (symmetric case). In the symmetric case,
(i) equilibria exist if the prior belief of facing type H is sufficiently large, and
(ii) in all equilibria, any level of misbehavior will be reported by either type, the team is formed,
and B chooses not to misbehave. Formally, R∗1(m1) = 1 for all m1 > 0, TB∗1 = TG∗1 = 1, and
m∗1 = 0.
Intuitively, when cooperation is sufficiently important for B, he is disciplined by the uncom-
promising reporting behavior of G and chooses not to misbehave.20
20 If Assumption 2 is not imposed, G’s reporting behavior might not be as uncompromising. It follows from the dis-
cussion above that in this case, condition (3) can be satisfied for m1 not too large, and hence for such levels of period 1
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4.2.2. The asymmetric case
We now turn to the case where B’s outside option is relatively attractive (bo > bc) such that he
is willing to cooperate with G only if he expects to get away with some strictly positive level of
misbehavior. Since, by Assumption 1, G is always willing to cooperate, this case is referred to as
asymmetric.
For example, one could think of G being either a young or new team member for whom
being accepted is very important so that his benefit from cooperation would be large. On the
other hand, B is more senior, and working with the unexperienced G may impose some cost on
him, thereby making cooperation with G considerably less attractive. As the subsequent analysis
suggest, underreporting might be particularly severe for such young (or new) group members.21
Furthermore, in the decision to enter a certain profession or team, some agents might take for
granted certain “fringe benefits” that arise from the possibility to indulge in some form of mis-
behavior. Indeed, Huberts et al. (p. 226) provide evidence that in a number of countries, it is not
uncommon for police officers to consider certain forms of misbehavior (such as accepting gifts
and free services) as being part of the standard, informal benefits of being in the force.22
We now show that in the asymmetric case, two types of period 1 equilibrium outcomes are
possible. In a first class of equilibria (i) the parties cooperate, (ii) the level of misbehavior is strictly
positive, but (iii) reporting does not occur in equilibrium: there is a wall of silence. It is shown that
such equilibria always exist. There may exists a second class of equilibria in which B and G fail
to cooperate. However, if both types of equilibria exist simultaneously, equilibria of the first type
payoff-dominate the equilibria of the second type. Hence, even if other equilibria exist it seems
plausible that the parties will coordinate on a (payoff-dominant) “wall of silence”-outcome.
To prove these claims, in a first step, we will now characterize which period 1 reporting behavior
is consistent with equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (reporting in asymmetric teams). In the asymmetric case,
(i) for all m1 there exist off-equilibrium beliefsβ0(m1) such that neither type ofG has an incentive
to deviate from R∗1(m1) = 0, and
(ii) for a given m1 there exist off-equilibrium beliefs β1(m1) such that neither type of G has an
incentive to deviate from R∗1(m1) = 1 if r(m1) − τ + m˜ − m∗(h) ≥ 0.
Intuitively, for a given m1 where the equilibrium strategies prescribe R∗1(m1) = 0 type H can
only be prevented from deviating if the future loss is sufficiently high. Only for off-equilibrium
misbehavior non-reporting by both types would be consistent with equilibrium. Then, in addition to the equilibria iden-
tified in Proposition 2, “wall of silence”-equilibria may emerge, in which the level of misbehavior in period 1 is strictly
positive and neither type reports. It can be shown that such equilibria exist and survive the Intuitive Criterion if and only
if m˜ − τ ≥ τ − r(m(h)) holds. This condition is, for example, satisfied if the reporting benefit is sufficiently small (i.e., if
r′ ≤ 1/2).
21 While systematic evidence is still scarce, this observation is consistent with available empirical studies on police
officers and teenagers that document a positive correlation between age and reporting rates; see, for example, Ekenvall
(2003, p. 226) and Finkelhor and Ormrod (2001, p. 222), respectively. In this respect, it is also interesting to note that in
San Francisco’s problem-ridden police department (see Footnote 14), the fraction of officers with short tenure has indeed
been substantial. Assuming that these officers are often paired with more senior partners, this hints at the existence of
asymmetric teams in this example.
22 Also, consider the following (admittedly stark) statement by a LA police officer, recorded in the course of investigating
the Rodney King case in 1991 reported in Chevigny (p. 35): “They give me a stick, they give me a gun, they pay me 50Gs
to have some fun”.
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beliefs above the threshold ˜β is this the case because such beliefs induce B to reject cooperation in
period 2. For a given prior h, R∗1(m1) = 1 is only consistent with equilibrium for sufficiently high
levels of m1 (see Proposition 2). Proposition 3 implies that while for certain m1, the equilibrium
strategies might require both types to report, for other levels of misbehavior the equilibrium
strategies might prescribe non-reporting.
Now consider B’s optimal choice of period 1 misbehavior m∗1. For given equilibrium reporting
strategiesR∗1(m1) ∈ {0, 1},Boptimally chooses the largest level of misbehavior for which reporting
does not occur. To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exists some mˆ1 > m∗1 that would
remain unreported by both types: in this case, by choosing mˆ1, B would still not be reported
and earn a higher payoff, contradicting the presumption that m∗1 was optimal. Hence, in any
equilibrium the maximizer m∗1 = max{m1|R∗1(m1) = 0} must be well defined, which implies
R∗1(m∗1) = 0 for any m∗1 > 0. Moreover, given bo > bc, party B will only propose forming a team
if m∗1 > 0. That is, if a team is indeed formed, there is both misbehavior and a complete wall of
silence in period 1, where neither type reports in equilibrium. In contrast to the symmetric case,
these wall of silence equilibria are consistent with Assumption 2.23 In particular, it follows from
Proposition 3(i) that there always exists an equilibrium where the parties cooperate, the maximum
level of misbehavior m¯ is chosen, but reporting does not occur. If the equilibrium reporting
strategies are such that the resulting m∗1 would be relatively low, the parties will not cooperate in
equilibrium. Such non-cooperation equilibria are, however, necessarily payoff-inferior because
in the cooperation equilibria, non-cooperation would have been an option for both parties. We
summarize this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (asymmetric case). In the asymmetric case,
(i) in any equilibrium where a team is formed there is a strictly positive first period level of
misbehavior m∗1 > 0 accompanied by a wall of silence (i.e., R∗1(m∗1) = 0). Equilibria of
this kind always exist. In particular, there always exists an equilibrium where m∗1 = m¯ and
R∗1(m¯) = 0, and
(ii) there might exist additional equilibria where the parties choose not to cooperate in period 1,
but such equilibria are payoff-dominated.
4.3. Implications
In the following, we discuss some implications arising from the above results. First, in the
presence of asymmetric information, walls of silence can emerge even in short-lived relationships
of known length.24 Furthermore, since such “wall of silence”-equilibria are particularly robust in
the asymmetric case (if possible) such team configurations should be avoided.
Second, it is interesting to note that, even if B is relatively certain to face the conscientious type
H, a “wall of silence”-equilibrium exhibiting a potentially high level of misbehavior might arise
23 Proposition 3 also holds when Assumption 2 is not imposed. This is obvious for part (i). As for part (ii), even without
imposing the restriction β1(m1) < h, there exist off-equilibrium beliefs such that the crucial incentive condition of type D
is satisfied if and only if it is satisfied for β1(m1) = 0.
24 Note that while we consider only two periods, we conjecture that the intuition gained in the present paper extends
to a multi-period version of the model where equilibria exhibiting misbehavior and walls of silence can be supported in
all but the last period; the availability of multiple future opportunities of interaction should make the threat of possible
non-cooperation even stronger.
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(see Propositions 3 and 4). Intuitively, even given a relatively high prior belief h, a team is formed
as long as B’s outside option is not too attractive. At the same time, the threat of non-cooperation,
which would result if B were sure to face H, is still sufficient to deter both types from reporting.
Thus, the existence of walls of silence is not necessarily sensitive to the fraction of agents who
would in principle be inclined to report any misbehavior. For example, in the police context this
suggests that, even if the majority of police officers are conscientious, high levels of misbehavior
and walls of silence might still emerge.
Third, while there exists a continuum of equilibria exhibiting a wall of silence, Proposition
4(i) implies that the respective equilibrium outcomes differ only with respect to the level of mis-
behavior in period 1. It is therefore instructive to derive a lower bound on m∗1 (denoted by m˜∗1)
and to use it as a measure for the minimum level of misbehavior to emerge in any equilibrium.25
The lower bound is determined by two forces. First, it follows from the above discussion that
m∗1 cannot be smaller than the minimum level for which type D would be willing to report
(see Proposition 3(ii)). Second, at the same time, as bc < bo, B prefers cooperation to his out-
side option only if he expects to get away with at least some minimum level of misbehavior.
In the following, we study in more detail how the lower bound on m∗1 varies with parameters
of the model. One interesting aspect will be to consider variations with respect to how much
G dislikes misbehavior by B. The simplest way of capturing this is to assume that a level m
of misbehavior reduces G’s payoff by s·m, where s∈ (0, 1] is commonly known (i.e., in all
of the previous analysis we have assumed s = 1). We obtain the following comparative statics
result.
Proposition 5 (comparative statics). The minimum period 1 level of misbehavior in any “wall of
silence”-equilibrium is weakly decreasing in h and s, and weakly increasing in the attractiveness
of B’s outside option relative to cooperation.
Intuitively, while the latter part of Proposition 5 is driven by B’s participation constraint, the
results on h and s follow from the critical type D’s incentive constraint.
First, consider an increase in h: since only pooling equilibria exist, a higher h leads to a lower
level of misbehavior in period 2 (see Lemma 2). In turn, this increases the difference between the
level of misbehavior off and on the equilibrium path (m(β1(m1)) −m(h) > 0), and as a consequence,
a deviation from reporting becomes less attractive for type D. Consequently, he is willing to report
lower levels of misbehavior. Taken together with the discussion above, we conclude that, while
a high probability of facing a conscientious type does not preclude the emergence of walls of
silence, it is nevertheless helpful in the sense that it makes lower levels of misbehavior sustainable
in equilibrium.26 From a practical point of view, it might, for example, be possible to increase
the number of conscientious agents by generating some turnover in combination with a recruiting
25 Note that the outcome m∗1 = m˜∗1 and R∗1(m˜∗1) = 0 would emerge as the unique equilibrium prediction in the asymmetric
case if the following two additional assumptions are imposed: (i) in the spirit of Cho and Kreps’ D1 criterion, Assumption
2 is strengthened to β0(m1) = 1 and β1(m1) = 0 for all m1, and (ii) G selects the reporting strategies that maximize his
equilibrium payoff. Intuitively, part (i) ensures that R∗1(m1) = 1 can be supported for levels of m1 as low as possible. Part
(ii) implies that whenever both R∗1(m1) = 1 and R∗1(m1) = 0 can be supported, R∗1(m1) = 1 is selected unless this would
lead B not to form the team.
26 Of course, the equilibrium level of misbehavior does not necessarily decrease when the lower bound does. On the
other hand, any factor that leads to an increase in the lower bound eliminates previously feasible equilibria with relatively
low levels of misbehavior. In this sense, our results are stronger in one direction (namely, which changes in parameters
should be avoided), and it applies that “You can pull a string, but you cannot [necessarily] push it”.
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policy that aims at hiring agents who tend to be less opportunistic than insiders (and to make this
commonly known).27
Furthermore, when s increases, B’s misbehavior is more strongly disliked by both types of
G. Consequently, type D’s willingness to report is enhanced, which again relaxes his incentive
constraint and makes lower equilibrium levels of misbehavior sustainable. This finding is consis-
tent with results from a comparative survey study by Huberts et al. (p. 225ff) on police integrity
in the Netherlands (NL) and in the US. They find that on average, officers in NL consider the
same infractions to be more serious than their US colleagues (which could be interpreted as s
being higher among NL officers). Also, the stated willingness to report is more uncompromising
in NL, and problems with police misbehavior and walls of silence are indeed less severe in NL
compared to the US. Huberts et al. also point out that this stronger awareness of Dutch officers is
not exogenously given, but the result of various measures to improve police integrity.28
Finally, Proposition 5 suggests that in countries where police officers earn relatively little in
comparison to alternative occupations (i.e., where bo is large), a large fraction of police officers
may enter this job only because it enables them to earn certain fringe benefits through misbehavior.
Everything else equal, the model suggests that misbehavior and walls of silence should be more
prevalent in such countries.
5. Conclusion
This paper explores the interplay between the behavior of black sheep (i.e., members of a
team engaging in activities disliked by their fellows) and the behavior of (honest) team members
who often fail to report such activities. In our model, such behavior arises as an equilibrium
phenomenon: black sheep choose to misbehave, and honest team members decide to set up a
wall of silence. The reason for doing so is that they worry about their reputation because they
do not want to forego future benefits from cooperation. The basic mechanism at work is that
the reporting decision may convey information about an honest team member’s type. Depending
on his own benefit from cooperation, this influences the decision of a potential black sheep to
cooperate in the first place. Our analysis suggests that the joint occurrence of misbehavior by
black sheep and a wall of silence setup by its team mates is most likely in asymmetric teams,
where the cooperation benefit is relatively large for honest team members and relatively small for
potential black sheep.29
At a more general level, our model of walls of silence driven by reputational concerns points to
the importance of providing anonymity to potential whistle-blowers. Indeed, ensuring anonymity
is considered crucial by many practitioners (see e.g., Trautman, 2000; Spitalli, 2004).30 In this
respect, it is interesting to note that the importance of the provision of anonymity would seem to
be less obvious if walls of silence were mainly driven by a direct preference to treat team members
favorably. On the other hand, in some settings secrecy will not be feasible or hard to achieve, in
27 To achieve this aim, practitioners often stress the importance of conducting background investigations on potential
candidates, which are considered a good predictor of future employee behavior.
28 In this spirit, Ku¨bler (2001) analyzes how socially undesirable norms may be successfully changed through instruments
such as symbolic acts or educational programs.
29 Our analysis thus hints at the potential importance of such asymmetries and suggests that special attention should be
paid to this issue in future empirical research on walls of silence.
30 See also the recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (in particular, Section 301), which includes anonymity provisions
for employee complaints about questionable accounting practices in publicly traded corporations. Various US state laws
(such as the California Whistle-Blower Protection Act) also contain anonymity clauses.
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which case it will be difficult to eliminate the reputational considerations that are the focus of
the present paper. For example, labor arbitrators will in general not admit anonymous (hearsay)
evidence (see e.g., Gosline (1988)). In addition, even if an anonymity policy is nominally in
place, information leakage might be hard to prevent in practice if administrative leaders do not
pay special attention to the enforcement of such provisions (see e.g., Sacramento News & Review).
Finally, we would like to point out that a full-fledged (normative) analysis of anonymity
provisions would have to take into account a further, potentially important dimension, namely
the role of trust among individuals in an organization. Active encouragement of whistle-blowing
might create an atmosphere of distrust that might adversely affect performance. While such issues
are beyond the scope of the present paper, they seem to be an interesting topic for future research.
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Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Lemma 2
We prove Lemma 2 by proving the following claim:
m∗(β) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
m˜ if b′(m˜) − β · p′(m˜) ≥ 0,
mˆ(β) if b′(m˜) − β · p′(m˜) < 0 < b′(0) − β · p′(0)
0 otherwise,
, and (5)
where mˆ(β) is implicitly defined by b′(mˆ) − β · p′(mˆ) = 0, and where mˆ(β) ∈ [0, m˜] holds for all
β. Proof of the claim: Note that b′′(m) − β · p′′(m) < 0∀m,β by assumption. For a given β, B
may choose some m ≤ m˜ or some m > m˜. From Lemma 1 it follows that only type H reports
for m ≤ m˜, and that both types report for all m > m˜. Note that m > m˜ can never be optimal
because b(m˜) − β · p(m˜) > b(m˜) − p(m˜) for all β < 1, and b′(m) − p′(m) < 0 by assumption.
This observation also implies that m = 0 is optimal for β = 1. Therefore, we only need to consider
m ≤ m˜ (i.e., values of m where only type H reports). If b′(m˜) − β · p′(m˜) ≥ 0, concavity implies
that b(m) −β·p(m) is increasing for all m ≤ m˜, and hence m˜ is optimal. If b′(0) − β · p′(0) ≤ 0,
concavity implies that b(m) −β·p(m) is decreasing for all m ≤ m˜, and hence m = 0 is optimal. If
b′(0) − β · p′(0) > 0 > b′(m˜) − β · p′(m˜), concavity and the Intermediate Value Theorem imply
that there exist some mˆ(β) ∈ (0, m˜) that solves b(mˆ) − β · p(mˆ) = 0. Finally, define a critical value
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βcrit implicitly by b′(m˜) − βcrit · p′(m˜) = 0, and note that b′(m˜) − β · p′(m˜) < 0 is equivalent to
β > βcrit. Hence, for all β > βcrit the optimal m is strictly below m˜ and decreasing in β.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3
If B chooses TB = 0, the game ends and both parties receive their reservation utilities. Hence,
G decides about TG if and only if TB = 1. It immediately follows from Assumption 1 that both
types of G strictly prefer to form the team independent of the belief subsequently held by B. Given
this equilibrium continuation, TB*(β) immediately follows from the discussion above the lemma.
Given that a team is formed, note that the equilibrium payoff of B is decreasing in β is obvious for
all β such that m∗(β) = m˜. For all other values of β this relationship follows from the Envelope-
Theorem. If a ˜β satisfying the definition in the Lemma fails to exist, we have TB*(β) = 0 for all β.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that in a candidate equilibrium R∗1(m1; H) = R∗1(m1; D) for some m1 ∈ [0, m¯]. In
order to prove that such behavior is not consistent with equilibrium, it has to be shown that at
least one type of G can gain from deviating.
Case 1 (bc − bo ≥ 0). First, suppose that R∗1(m1; H) = 1 and R∗1(m1; D) = 0. In this case the
incentive compatibility condition for type D is given by −m1 + gc − m˜ ≥ −m1 + r(m1) − τ +
gc ⇔ −m˜ ≥ r(m1) − τ. If m1 > m˜, then r(m1) − τ > 0, and D’s incentive compatibility condi-
tion cannot be satisfied. If m1 ≤ m˜, then r(m1) − τ ≤ 0. Note that −m˜ ≥ r(m1) − τ ⇔ −r(m1) ≥
m˜ − r(m˜). Moreover, m˜ − r(m˜) > 0 because r(0) = 0 and r′ < 1, which again yields a contradic-
tion because −r(m1) ≤ 0 for all m1. Second, suppose that R∗1(m1; H) = 0 and R∗1(m1; D) = 1.
The incentive compatibility condition of type H is given by −m1 + gc ≥ −m1 + r(m1) +
gc − m˜ + r(m˜) ⇔ m˜ ≥ r(m1) + τ. The incentive compatibility condition of type D is given
by −m1 + r(m1) − τ + gc − m˜ ≥ −m1 + gc ⇔ r(m1) − τ ≥ m˜. Hence, if both incentive com-
patibility conditions were satisfied simultaneously this would imply that −τ ≥ τ, which is not
possible.
Case 2 (bc − bo < 0). First, suppose that R∗1(m1; H) = 1 and R∗1(m1; D) = 0. In this case the
incentive compatibility condition of type H is given by −m1 + r(m1) + bo ≥ −m1 + gc −
m˜ + r(m˜) ⇔ 0 ≥ [gc − go] + [r(m˜) − m˜] − r(m1), which is violated for all levels of m1 if it
is violated for m1 = m¯. This is the case because 0 ≥ [gc − go] + [r(m˜) − m˜] − r(m¯) ⇔ 0 ≥
[gc − m¯ − go] + [r(m˜) − m˜] − [r(m¯) − m¯] cannot be satisfied due to Assumption 1, r′ < 1 and
m˜ < m¯. Second, suppose that R∗1(m1; H) = 0 and R∗1(m1; D) = 1. In this case the incentive com-
patibility condition of type H is given by −m1 + go ≥ −m1 + r(m1) + gc − m˜ + r(m˜) ⇔ 0 ≥
[gc − m˜ − go] + r(m1) + r(m˜) which cannot be satisfied due to Assumption 1.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 4
As discussed in Section 4.1, despite the fact that we study a framework of incomplete
information, in our setup the One-Deviation Principle (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.
109) applies. Consequently, in order to verify which period 1 reporting strategies are consistent
with equilibrium, one only needs to consider deviations from the candidate reporting strategies,
while the equilibrium continuation in period 2 may be taken as given. In the following, we prove
the lemma for the case that both types of G are supposed not to report (i.e., R∗1(m1) = 0) and
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bc − bo ≥ 0 holds. The proof for the remaining cases is analogous, and therefore omitted. The
claim holds if type H has a larger incentive to deviate than type D. This is the case if the difference
between type H’s candidate equilibrium payoff and his payoff following a deviation, which is
given by [gc − m∗(h) + r(m∗(h))] − [r(m1) + gc − m∗(β) + r(m∗(β))] and is smaller than the
difference between type D’s candidate equilibrium payoff and his payoff following a deviation,
which is given by [gc − m∗(h)] − [r(m1) − τ + gc − m∗(β)], where β∈ [0, 1] denotes the off-
equilibrium belief. As r(m∗(h)) − τ − r(m∗(β)) ≤ r(m˜) − τ − r(m∗(β)) = −r(m∗(β)) ≤ 0 ∀β,
this is indeed the case.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that if the Intuitive Criterion has bite it implies β0(m1) = 1 respectively β1(m1) = 0,
which will imply that the results derived below are robust to the Intuitive Criterion. First, Lemma
4 implies that R∗1(m1) = 0 is consistent with equilibrium if and only if −r(m1) + [r(m∗(h)) −
m∗(h)] − [r(m∗(β0(m1))) − m∗(β0(m1))] ≥ 0, which, however, is violated due to Assumption 2
and r′ < 1. Second, Lemma 4 implies that R∗1(m1) = 1 is consistent with equilibrium if and only
if r(m1) − τ + m∗(β1(m1)) − m∗(h) ≥ 0. Note that for all m1 there exist off-equilibrium beliefs
such that this inequality is satisfied, if it can be satisfied form1 = 0. This is the case if h is sufficiently
large. To see this, note that for m1 = 0 and β1(m1) = 0 type D’s incentive condition simplifies to
[m˜ − τ] − m∗(h) ≥ 0, which is satisfied for large h because the term in square brackets is strictly
positive. The period 1 level of misbehavior m∗1 has to be optimal given the equilibrium reporting
strategies and given the equilibrium continuation in period 2. It follows from the reasoning above
that in equilibrium the period 1 choice of the level of misbehavior has no impact on B’s period 2
belief, which just equals h. Hence, B chooses the level of misbehavior that maximizes his period
1 payoff, and given that any misbehavior is reported, it follows that m∗1 = 0 is optimal. Finally,
given Assumption 1 and bc ≥ bo, both parties choose to cooperate.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that if the Intuitive Criterion has bite it implies β0(m1) = 1, respectively β1(m1) = 0,
which will imply that the results derived below are robust to the Intuitive Criterion. First, consider
R∗1(m1) = 0. Lemma 4 implies that the incentive compatibility condition of type H is decisive. It
follows from the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.5 that, given Assumption 2, R∗1(m1) = 0 is
not consistent with equilibrium if β0(m1) ≤ ˜β. However, if β0(m1) > ˜β, the parties do not cooper-
ate in period 2, and hence the incentive compatibility condition of type H is given by gc − m∗(h) +
r(m∗(h)) ≥ r(m1) + go ⇔ [gc − go] + [r(m∗(h)) − m∗(h)] − r(m1) ≥ 0. The above inequality
is satisfied if it is satisfied for m1 = m¯ : [gc − go] + [r(m∗(h)) − m∗(h)] − r(m¯) ≥ 0 ⇔ [gc −
go − m¯] + [r(m∗(h)) − m∗(h)] − [r(m¯) − m¯] ≥ 0, which holds due to Assumption 1 and r′ < 1.
Second, consider R∗1(m1) = 1. Lemma 4 implies that the incentive compatibility condition of type
D is decisive. For a given m1 the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A.5 implies that R∗1(m1) = 1
is consistent with equilibrium if r(m1) − τ − m∗(h) + m∗(β1(m1)) ≥ 0. Off-equilibrium beliefs
β1(m1) such that this inequality is satisfied exist if and only if r(m1) − τ − m∗(h) + m∗(0) ≥ 0.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4
Note that in any equilibrium no additional information regarding the type of G is revealed.
Hence, the period 2 equilibrium outcome is independent of the choice of the period 1 equilibrium
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strategies. In particular, this implies that both the period 1 level of misbehavior and the period
1 cooperation decisions have to maximize period 1 payoffs. Suppose the candidate equilibrium
strategies are such that at date 1 B anticipates that m∗1 = 0. In this case his period 1 payoff would
be given by bc, which is smaller than bo. Hence, B will choose TB∗1 = 0. This proves that in any
equilibrium where the parties cooperate, m∗1 > 0 has to hold. As Proposition 1 shows that only
pooled reporting decisions are consistent with equilibrium, if a certain level of m1 is reported,
it is reported with certainty. Moreover, as b(m1) > b(m1) − p(m1) for all m1 > 0, B will choose
the highest level of m1 such that R∗1(m1) = 0. If such a maximizer fails to exist, the respective
candidate reporting strategies cannot be part of an equilibrium. Finally, it immediately follows
from Proposition 3(i) that there exists an equilibrium where m∗1 = m¯ and R∗1(m¯) = 0. In such an
equilibrium both parties want to cooperate. G wants to cooperate due to Assumption 1. B wants
to cooperate due to the fact that in equilibrium he is not reported in period 1, and hence gets away
with a level of misbehavior m¯ resulting in a period 1 payoff of bc + b(m¯) > bo.
A.8. Proof of Proposition 5
To ensure that G still prefers lower levels of misbehavior, one has to assume r′ < s. In this
case, Propositions 3 and 4 continue to hold with the only modification that Proposition 3(ii) now
reads: for a given m1 there exist off-equilibrium beliefs β1(m1) such that neither type of G has an
incentive to deviate from R∗1(m1) = 1 if r(m1) − τ + s · m˜ − s · m∗(h) ≥ 0. As discussed above,
the exact value of the lower bound m˜∗1 is determined by two forces. On the one hand, it follows
from Proposition 3(ii) that R∗(m1) = 1 cannot be consistent with equilibrium for values of m1
below some threshold level m˜R1 that is implicitly defined by r(m˜R1 ) − τ + s · [m˜ − m∗(h)] = 0.
On the other hand, it is clear from Proposition 4 that B is only willing to form the team if
m∗1 ≥ m˜T1 , where m˜T1 is implicitly defined by b(m˜T1 ) = bo − bc. Together, these observations
imply m˜∗1 = max{m˜R1 , m˜T1 }, and Proposition 5 immediately follows from Lemma 2 and the Implicit
Function Theorem.
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